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legal or [clonstitutional. - Rep. Zoe Lofgren'
On January 31, 2011, just a few days before the Super Bowl, Immi-
grations and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") agents seized
Rojadirecta.com and Rojadirecta.org (collectively "Rojadirecta") 2 as
part of its "Operation: In Our Sites" initiative to protect intellectual
property ("IP") rights.' Rojadirecta is a popular online sports forum
where users can post anything from gripes about a botched pass to pre-
dictions for the football championship.' Users can also post videos.
Rojadirecta organizes the posts by sporting event, but it does not moni-
tor each post nor does it check each video's origin. As such, users can-
and, allegedly, do-post videos that infringe on valid copyrights.
Pursuant to ICE's seizure, the government filed a complaint against
Rojadirecta, alleging that the site facilitates criminal copyright infringe-
ment and thus is subject to civil forfeiture.' The owners of Rojadirecta, a
Spanish company called Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. ("Puerto 80"), chal-
lenged ICE's seizure and moved to dismiss the forfeiture action.' After
over a year of continuances, amended pleadings, and hearings, the gov-
ernment dropped the case and returned the domain names so that Puerto
80 could resume its operation.'
Although dropping a case is not in itself remarkable, dropping this
case raises interesting questions. Does the civil forfeiture regime provide
for forfeiture of websites like Rojadirecta? Can criminal copyright law
be stretched to support this effort to combat piracy? Should sites like
Rojadirecta, subjected to seizure, fight back? Is the government's action
here indicative of future plans to take action against contributory
infringement? After all, no court has directly ruled on whether a domain
name may be civilly forfeited for criminal copyright infringement. Did
the government, in seizing these domain names, have a legal leg to stand
on?
1. Zoe Lofgren, Rep Zoe Lofgren Asks Reddit Users to Crowdsource Domain Name Seizure
Legislative Proposal, CONGRESSWOMAN ZOE LOFOREN (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.lofgren.
house.govlatest-news/rep-zoe-lofgren-asks-reddit-users-to-crowdsource-legislative-proposals-on-
domain-name-seizures/ [hereinafter Lofgren Proposal].
2. Both the Rojadirecta.com and Rojadirecta.org domain names lead to the same website/
content.
3. See The U.S. Government Withdraws Complaint Against the Rojadirecta Domains and the
Court Orders Their Return, ROJADIRECTA (BLOG) (August 30, 2012), http://blog.rojadirecta.me.
4. See ROJADIRECTA (FORUM), http://forum.rojadirecta.es/forum.php (last visited Dec. 29,
2013).
5. See Verified Complaint, United States v. Rojadirecta.org, No. 11 Civ. 4139, 2011 WL
2428753 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Verified Complaint].
6. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Claimant's Motion to Dismiss,
United States v. Rojadirecta.org, No. I l-cv-4139, 2011 WL 8200848 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2011)
[hereinafter First Motion to Dismiss].
7. See RojADIRECTA (BLOG), supra note 3.
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This Comment will argue that the government had no legal basis in
seizing Rojadirecta and that the government improperly used forfeiture
to avoid fruitless criminal prosecutions and to take down pesky, though
innocent, websites. First, this Comment will outline the civil forfeiture
structure, emphasizing its controversial mix of low legal standards and
costly penal effect. Second, this Comment will explain how Operation:
In Our Sites has been using civil forfeiture as its primary weapon to
combat online IP infringement. Next, Section Three will explain the
convoluted procedural history of Rojadirecta's case-a means by which
the government was able to forestall adjudication on the merits-and
will further argue that, had the district court reached the merits of the
case, there would be no way the government's theory could prevail
based on the facts alleged. Section Four will parallel examples from the
cultural property context, where both the government and the judiciary
have been criticized for misapplying law, or for not examining whether
certain elements were met, in the name of returning priceless artifacts to
their home countries. Finally, Section Five will caution that the govern-
ment may be taking steps to legalize domain name forfeiture, which fur-
ther emphasizes that it is not yet legal and foreshadows the drastic
lengths to which the government will go to quelch copyright
infringement.
II. THE CIVIL FoRFEITuRE STRUCTURE
Civil forfeiture is a legal regime by which the government can seize
property that is connected to the commission of a criminal act.' There-
fore, while forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature, civil forfeiture is
innately tied to criminal law.9 However, a major distinction is that civil
forfeiture is by nature in rem, and thus is not tied to the person who
committed the criminal act."o This contentious structure, as used in the
IP context, creates the risk that technological innovation could be need-
lessly stilted without the government having to establish criminal fault.
The first subsection will explain the policy behind forfeiture and the
second subsection will describe the procedure involved in a civil forfei-
ture action. Finally, the third subsection will explain how civil forfeiture
differs from criminal forfeiture, with a focus on the incongruous burdens
that the government must prove.
8. 37 C.J.S. Forfeitures § 46 (2012).
9. Id. at § 47 (defining a civil forfeiture as a "hybrid" procedure of mixed civil and criminal
law elements).
10. Id. at § 46 (explaining that an in rem civil forfeiture action is brought against the property,
rather than against the owner of the property; therefore, property can be forfeited even if the
owner did not violate the law).
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A. The Policy Behind Forfeiture
Forfeiture, particularly civil forfeiture, serves several important
functions. First, forfeiting infringing items, which are essentially contra-
band, ensures that they cannot be sold or redistributed." Forfeiture also
prevents the relevant property from being used to commit further
crimes.'2 Additionally, forfeiture serves as a powerful deterrent 1-it is
this policy consideration that perhaps outweighs all others in the
Rojadirecta case.
B. The Procedure of Civil Forfeiture Actions
The authority to bring a civil forfeiture action generally is found in
18 U.S.C. § 981.14 Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 2323 specifically provides
for the forfeiture of property used to facilitate infringement. 15 Forfeiture
proceedings, however, are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 983.16 The first step
in a civil forfeiture proceeding is that the government obtains a seizure
warrant based on probable cause that the res is being used to facilitate a
crime." After securing the warrant, the government seizes the res and
serves notice on its owner. The owner may then file a claim with the
appropriate official after the seizure.' 8 If no claim is filed, the property is
administratively forfeited to the government.' 9 If the owner does file a
claim, however, the government has ninety days to file a civil forfeiture
action in district court, or else it must return the property. 20 The govern-
ment has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the res is subject to forfeiture.2 1 If the theory behind forfeiture is that the
property is being used to facilitate a crime, the government must also
show a substantial connection between the crime and the property.22 If
the owner does not appear in court, the proceeding is defaulted and the
res is forfeited.
However, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 983(f) as part of the Civil
11. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL 357
(4th ed. 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/prosecuting-ip-
crimesmanual_2013.pdf [hereinafter DOJ MANUAL].
12. Id. at 357-58.
13. Id. at 358.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2012).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 2323(a)(1)(B) (2012).
16. See id. at (a)(2).
17. See § 981(b)(2).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2)(A) (2012).
19. See, e.g., Operation In Our Sites Protects American Online Shoppers, Cracks Down on
Counterfeiters, IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/
news/releases/i 1111/111 128washingtondc.htm.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3).
21. Id. at (c)(1).
22. Id. at (c)(3).
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Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 ("CAFRA"), to allow an owner to
seek immediate release of seized property where the government's con-
tinued possession of the property would pose a substantial hardship to
the owner.23 Of course, contraband may not be released.2 4 However,
Section 983(f) will also not provide for the release of property that is
"likely to be used to commit additional criminal acts if returned to the
claimant." 25 As such, motions for release under Section 983(f) in the
context of allegedly infringing domain names may raise room for debate
as to whether release would lead to more alleged IP infringement.
C. The Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Forfeiture
Section 2319A of Title 18 of the United States Code provides for
mandatory forfeiture and destruction of all infringing items upon a
defendant's conviction.2 6 From a procedural standpoint, criminal forfei-
ture has more safeguards because it comes only after the government has
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of an
offense and that the forfeited property was connected to the offense.
Criminal forfeiture thereby raises no due process concerns.
Because civil forfeiture is in rem, however, the owner of the prop-
erty does not need to be party to the suit. In fact, civil forfeiture predi-
cated on criminal copyright infringement does not even require that the
forfeited property be the property of the infringer. Forfeiture of third-
party property is possible, so long as the property owner does not assert
an "innocent owner" defense.2 7 A claimant only has to put on the "inno-
cent owner" defense after the government has met its burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was used to com-
mit or facilitate a criminal offense, and that the property was substan-
tially connected to the offense.28 This showing shifts the burden to the
claimant.29
In theory, the preponderance of the evidence standard should not be
difficult for the innocent owner to overcome. However, the financial
burdens of disputing seizures in court, paired with the lack of personal
punishment and stigma connected to criminal charges, give little incen-
23. See Stefan D. Cassella, The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Expanded
Government Forfeiture Authority and Strict Deadlines Imposed on All Parties, 27 J. LEGIS. 97,
107 (2001).
24. See id.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 983(f)(8).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(b)-(c) (2012).
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1) ("An innocent owner's interest in property shall not be
forfeited under any civil forfeiture statute.").
28. Id. at (c)(3).
29. Id. at (d)(1).
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tive to actually challenge the seizure of property. Consequently, a
domain name owner with limited means and, perhaps, a foggy under-
standing of IP law might not find it worthwhile to file a claim, letting the
domain name be administratively forfeited. If, conversely, the domain
name forfeiture were tied to criminal charges, the property owner likely
would fight much more zealously to assert his innocence.
The concept of in rem civil forfeiture has been called a "fiction."30
A leading treatise on forfeiture even begins by commenting: "Forfeitures
are not favored; the law and equity abhor a forfeiture. Forfeitures are
considered harsh, oppressive, odious, penal in nature, and to be avoided
when possible." 3' Nevertheless, the government continues to use civil
forfeiture to confiscate, thereby obviating the need for a criminal
prosecution.
III. OPERNTION: IN OUR SITES
Operation: In Our Sites is an IP enforcement program created by
the National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center ("IPR
Center") and managed by ICE's Homeland Security Investigations
("HSI").32 Operation: In Our Sites specifically targets websites that sell
or distribute counterfeit and pirated items over the internet.3 3 The pro-
gram's mission statement declares:
IP thieves are increasingly using the Internet as a means of advertis-
ing, promoting, offering and selling their illegal products. Through
Operation In Our Sites, the IPR Center and its partner agencies
aggressively pursue those who steal from American businesses and
ultimately the American workers who work to produce the real goods
and products. IP theft results in lost American jobs, stolen business
profits, and lost pension and health care payments. Perhaps most seri-
ously, it creates potential risk to consumers' health and safety.
Those selling counterfeit and pirated products, whether in a storefront
or on the Web, are violating federal criminal laws. If the IPR Center
receives credible information about intellectual property rights viola-
tions and our law enforcement investigation determines there has
been criminal wrongdoing, we will work with the U.S. Department of
Justice to prosecute, convict, and punish individuals as well as seize
website domain names, profits, and other property from IP thieves.34
In June 2010, as part of its first phase of Operation: In Our Sites, ICE
30. 37 C.J.S. Forfeitures § 4 (2012).
31. Id. at § 1 (internal citations omitted).
32. See Operation In Our Sites, NAT'L INTELLECTUAL PRop. RIGHTS COORDINATION CTR.,
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seized nine domain names of sites that allegedly "offer[ed] first-run
movies, often within hours of their theatrical release[s]."" Next, in
"Version 2.0," ICE seized eighty-two domain names on November 29,
2010-that date was Cyber Monday, the busiest online shopping day of
the year.3 6 This time, the seized domain names allegedly had been used
to sell counterfeit goods, in violation of both copyright and trademark
laws.
The seizure of Rojadirecta came pursuant to the third phase of
Operation: In Our Sites. This phase seized ten domain names that
allegedly "illegally streamed copyrighted sporting and pay-per-view
events."3 In his official statement, United States Attorney for the South-
ern District of New York Preet Bharara said:
The illegal streaming of professional sporting events over the Internet
deals a financial body blow to the leagues and broadcasters who are
forced to pass their losses off to the fans in the form of higher priced
tickets and pay-per-view events. With the Super Bowl just days
away, the seizures of these infringing websites reaffirm our commit-
ment to working with our law enforcement partners to protect copy-
righted material and put the people who steal it out of business.40
Notably, all ten domain names were "linking" sites-sites that do not
host illegal content directly, but rather collect and catalog links to other
websites that feature illegal copies of copyrighted content.4 1 "Linking"
sites make more effective targets because of their popularity: "[Tlhey
allow users to quickly browse content and locate illegal streams that
would otherwise be more difficult to find."4 2 ICE's takedown is analo-
gous to cutting down a beehive, rather than killing each individual bee.
As of January 31, 2013, Operation: In Our Sites has led to the
seizure of more than 2,000 websites.4 3 And as of December 20, 2012,
35. "Operation In Our Sites" Targets Internet Movie Pirates, NAT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP.
RIGHTS COORDINATION CTR. (June 30, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.iprcenter.gov/partners/ice/
news-releases/operation-in-our-sites-targets-internet-movie-pirates.
36. Operation In Our Sites 2.0, NAT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS COORDINATION CTR.,
http://www.iprcenter.gov/news-releases/video/operation-in-our-sites-2.0 (last visited Feb. 11,
2013).
37. ICE Seizes 82 Website Domains Involved in Selling Counterfeit Goods as Part of Cyber
Monday Crackdown, IMMIGRATION & CusToMs ENFORCEMENT (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.ice.
gov/news/releases/10 11/101 129washington.htm.
38. New York Investigators Seize 10 Websites That Illegally Streamed Copyrighted Sporting






43. ICE, CBP, USPIS Seize More Than $13.6 Million in Fake NFL Merchandise During
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more than 690 of those sites have been forfeited." However, there is no
comprehensive list of the websites that have been forfeited. Indeed, ICE
and Operation: In Our Sites have been widely criticized for their
secrecy, even being accused of flat-out lying.45 For example, in June
2011, Erik Barnett, Assistant Deputy Director of ICE, claimed that
"[Site owners] can challenge the seizure, but no one has yet." 4 6 In
response to this statement, Techdirt released a list of sites, obtained from
"a confidential source with knowledge of these things," whose owners
were indeed attempting to challenge the seizures.47 The list included
Rojadirecta, discussed in more detail below. Although this list cannot be
verified, and its source may be dubious, ICE's failure to be forthright
about its forfeiture statistics has certainly raised some eyebrows.
IV. THE CASE OF ROJADIRECTA
Rojadirecta is a "sports broadcast index," linking visitors to stream-
ing sporting events hosted by third parties.4 8 These third parties stream
video that is copyrighted by NBA, MLB, NFL, and other sporting
leagues.49 Rojadirecta hosts no broadcasts itself.50 In early 2011, accord-
ing to Alexa.com (a site that ranks websites by usage), Rojadirecta.org
and Rojadirecta.com were ranked the 2,380th and 2,326th most popular
websites in the world, respectively, and the 119th and 109th most popu-
lar websites in Spain, respectively.5 I Rojadirecta's popularity made it a
clear target for forfeiture, sending a worldwide message that the United
States government intends to stop piracy at any cost.
A. The Procedural History of United States v. Rojadirecta.org
On January 31, 2011, ICE obtained a seizure warrant from the Hon-
orable Frank Maas, United States Magistrate Judge for the Southern Dis-
'Operation Red Zone,' IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.
ice.gov/news/releases/1301/130131neworleans.htm.
44. Houston HSI Seizes 89 Websites Selling Counterfeit Goods, IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1212/121220houston.htm.
45. Mike Masnick, ICE Declares 'Mission Accomplished' on Domain Seizures, TECHDIRT
(June 10, 2011, 10:30 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110608/20310614626/ice-wants-
european-countries-to-join-domain-seizure-party.shtml.
46. Id.
47. Mike Masnick, The List of Sites Challenging Domain Seizures, TECHDIRT (June 13, 2011,
10:47 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110612/21573514664/list-sites-challenging-
domain-seizures.shtnl.
48. See U.S. Resume Controversial File-Sharing Domain Seizures (Updated), TORRENTFREAK
(Feb. 1, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/us-resume-file-sharing-domain-seizures-l 10201.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Verified Complaint, supra note 5, at 10.
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trict of New York, to seize the two Rojadirecta domain names.52
Pursuant to the warrant, the Rojadirecta domain names were seized.53
The content of the website was changed to show only the following
image:54
This domain name has been seized by ICE -Nomeland Security Investigations,
Special Agent in Charge, New York Offloe, In accordance with a seizure warrant
obtained by the United States Attorney's Office for the Southem District of
New York and issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. g 981 and 2323 by the United
States District Court for the Southem District of New York.
Its unawful to reproduce or distdhute opyrfledmaterial, such as moie MUSi:,
software or games without atforizaton. Indwoduals wt wilifdly reproduce or
distribute copyr/Stedmateral, withoutauthoration, dsk. criminalprosecution
under18 l.&C. 2319. Fist-time offenders convcted ofa srmnal feony
copyrit law willface up to Mheyears in federalprison restftffon, forfeiture and fne.
The text reads:
This domain name has been seized by ICE - Homeland Security
Investigations, Special Agent in Charge, New York Office, in accor-
dance with a seizure warrant obtained by the United States Attorney's
Office for the Southern District of New York and issued pursuant to
18 U.S.C. §§ 981 and 2323 by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
It is unlawful to reproduce or distribute copyrighted material, such as
movies, music, software or games, without authorization. Individuals
who willfully reproduce or distribute copyrighted material, without
authorization, risk criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2319.
First-time offenders convicted of a criminal felony copyright law will
52. Id. at 2.
53. Rojadirecta's blog claims that the actual seizure occurred on January 31, 2011, see
ROJADIRECTA (BLOG), supra note 3, but the complaint alleges the seizure occurred on February 1,
2011, see Verified Complaint, supra note 5, at 1.
54. See Bianca Bosker, Rojadirecta.org One of Several Sites SEIZED By U.S. Authorities,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011, 7:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/02/
rojadirecta-org-seizedn_817458.html.
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face up to five years in federal prison, restitution, forfeiture and
fine.55
On March 22, 2011, Puerto 80 took the first step toward having the
Rojadirecta domain names returned by filing Seized Asset Claim Forms
with the Department of Homeland Security. 6 Separately, on June 13,
2011, Puerto 80 petitioned for immediate return of the domain names
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(f).57 This petition alleged, among other
things, that the government's seizure violated Puerto 80's First Amend-
ment rights and was an imperrnissible "prior restraint" on free speech,
amounting to unconstitutional censorship." The district court denied the
petition, and Puerto 80 appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
to assess the constitutionality of these seizures." The Second Circuit
never ruled on the constitutional aspects of the case because, as
explained below, the government returned the Rojadirecta domain
names, mooting the appeal.60
Pursuant to Section 983(a)(3)(A), Assistant United States Attorneys
Christopher D. Frey and David I. Miller filed the forfeiture complaint on
June 17, 2011.6 ' The complaint alleged that Rojadirecta was a "linking"
website. 62 The complaint continued to allege that Rojadirecta "dis-
played" categories of links to copyrighted content and that the links
"changed" and "were added" as the day progressed.63 It did not allege
that Puerto 80 was responsible for these displays and changes. Indeed,
the complaint even noted that "the content ran on a live stream from
another website," without alleging that Puerto 80 had any connection to
the other website."
Puerto 80 filed a motion to dismiss on August 5, 2011, arguing that
the complaint failed to allege a theory of criminal copyright infringe-
ment from which probable cause to seize Rojadirecta could be estab-
lished. 6 5 On December 7, 2011, the Honorable Paul A. Crotty granted
55. Id.
56. Brief for the United States, Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. v. United States, No. 11-3390, 2011
WL 5833572, at *6 (2d Cir. Nov. 15, 2011).
57. See id. at *2.
58. Id. at *7.
59. Opening Brief and Special Appendix for Petitioner-Appellant Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U.,
Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. v. United States, No. 11-3390, 2011 WL 4440567, at *4 (2d Cir. Sep.
16, 2011).
60. For a thorough assessment of the constitutionality of domain name seizures, particularly
in the case of Rojadirecta, see Guy W. Huber, "Unfriending" the Internet: U.S. Government
Domain Name Seizures and a Democratic Web, 15 Tut. J. TECH. & INTELL. PRoP. 243 (2012).
61. Verified Complaint, supra note 5, at 1.
62. Id. at 6.
63. Id. at 8.
64. Id.
65. See First Motion to Dismiss, supra note 6, at 1.
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the motion to dismiss without prejudice, giving the government the
opportunity to amend its complaint.6 6 On January 6, 2012, the govern-
ment filed its amended complaint,6 7 and on February 14, 2012, Puerto
80 filed another motion to dismiss.68 However, before the district court
could rule on the motion to dismiss, the government filed a voluntary
dismissal on August 29, 2012.69
B. The Legal Merits of the Forfeiture Complaint
Because the case never made it to discovery, one could only specu-
late as to whether the government could have won its forfeiture action.
However, accepting the facts in the government's amended complaint as
true, it is likely that websites such as Rojadirecta, where users post
videos and where no content is copied nor stored on the site's server, are
not within the scope of forfeitable property because of the impracticable
factual investigations that would be required to satisfy the government's
burden of proof. As the following subsections will show, the govern-
ment did not adequately allege criminal copyright infringement in the
first place, so the argument that the government's reading of "facilitate"
within the civil forfeiture statute was unconstitutionally broad does not
even need to be addressed.o
i. THE COMPLAINT COULD NOT SHOw THAT PUERTO 80 COMMITrED
DIRECT CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
In order to succeed in its forfeiture action, the government would
have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Rojadirecta facili-
tated criminal copyright infringement in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 506.'
66. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Rojadirecta.org, No. 11-cv-4139
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011) (ECF No. 28).
67. Verified Amended Complaint, United States v. Rojadirecta.org, No. 11-cv-4139, 2012
WL 2869487 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Amended Complaint].
68. Memorandum of Law in Support of Claimant Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U.'s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, United States v. Rojadirecta.org, No. 1 l-cv-4139, 2012
WL 2869495 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 14, 2012) [hereinafter Second Motion to Dismiss].
69. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, United States v. Rojadirecta.org, No. 1l-cv-4139
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012) (ECF No. 55).
70. This argument was not only raised by Puerto 80 in the § 983(f) claim, but also in both
Motions to Dismiss. Indeed, most scholarly debate about ICE's seizure scheme centers on this
argument. See, e.g., Huber, supra note 60.
71. Section 506 defines criminal copyright infringement as infringement willfully committed
(A) for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain; (B) by the
reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180-day
period, of I or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which
have a total retail value of more than $1,000; or (C) by the distribution of a work
being prepared for commercial distribution, by making it available on a computer
network accessible to members of the public, if such person knew or should have
known that the work was intended for commercial distribution.
17 U.S.C. § 506(l)(A)-(C) (2012).
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The basic elements of infringement, however, are the same as in the civil
context; the criminal aspect comes solely from the additional require-
ments in Section 506(a).7 2 Therefore, we must first look to the civil stat-
ute, 17 U.S.C. § 501, to determine whether the complaint alleged basic
infringement.
Paragraph six of the Amended Complaint alleges that illegal
streaming of copyright-protected content can be accomplished in one of
three ways: 1) by capturing the output of a television and directing that
output to a computer, "where it is simultaneously and continuously
encoded and uploaded in a 'stream' to so-called illegal streaming web-
sites"; 2) by hacking the authorized online streams of the copyright
holders and then directing those streams to illegal streaming websites; or
3) by videotaping a television or computer screen to capture the desired
programming, and then uploading that tape to illegal streaming web-
sites. Any of these three methods would violate the copyright holder's
exclusive rights of reproduction and public performance, as protected by
17 U.S.C. § 106.74 Both the initial and amended complaints also alleged
violations of the distribution right, 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), but neither com-
plaint alleged that any copies were made on viewers' computers. In
order to violate the distribution right, an electronic transfer must make a
tangible "copy" in the computer's hard drive.76 Therefore, streaming a
copy does not "distribute" that copy within the meaning of the Copy-
right Act. As such, the government's contention that Rojadirecta facili-
tated criminal infringement of the distribution right has no legal basis.
Nevertheless, the copyright holders of the allegedly infringing
videos have had their rights of reproduction and public performance
directly violated. However, Puerto 80 is not the entity responsible for
violating these rights. Rather, Rojadirecta users provided links to third-
party websites where someone-presumably the owners of those sites-
had used one of the previously mentioned methods to create an illegal
stream. Indeed, the amended complaint even admitted that the allegedly
unauthorized copyrighted content "ran on a live stream from another
website" and was merely linked to Rojadirecta." Because the complaint
did not allege that Puerto 80 was itself responsible for reproducing the
72. See 5-15 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 15.01 (2013).
73. Amended Complaint, supra note 67, at 2-3.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) gives the copyright owner the exclusive right to reproduce the work in
copies or phonorecords. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) gives the owner of a copyrighted audiovisual work
(here, the video of a sporting event) the exclusive right to perform the work publicly.
75. Verified Complaint, supra note 5, at 3; Amended Complaint, supra note 67, at 3.
76. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1162 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
Google's HTML instructions, which do not themselves cause infringing images to be copied, do
not violate the distribution right).
77. Amended Complaint, supra note 67, at II (emphasis added).
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videos, the government could not have proven that Puerto 80 committed
direct criminal copyright infringement." It follows that Rojadirecta
could not have been subjected to forfeiture if prosecutors had brought an
in personam action against Puerto 80; instead, the government was seek-
ing to use civil forfeiture to obtain the property of an innocent owner.
ii. THERE IS No LEGAL BASIS FOR CONTRIBUTORY CRIMINAL
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
If the Rojadirecta forfeiture claim were predicated on any action of
Puerto 80, such action would not give rise to probable cause of criminal
infringement. As shown above, Puerto 80 has not committed any direct
infringement. This subsection discusses why, even if Puerto 80 could be
considered a contributory infringer, 9 contributory infringement is not a
valid legal basis for civil forfeiture.
While 18 U.S.C. § 2323 provides for forfeiture of property used in
violation of Title 17 of the United States Code, there is no statutory
provision for contributory copyright infringement. Contributory civil
copyright infringement has arisen as a common-law cause of action, but
it was never codified. Consequently, there is no such thing as contribu-
tory criminal copyright infringement. While there is a statutory basis for
conspiracy to criminally infringe,so this would require that the direct
infringer and the contributory infringer act in concert. No United States
court has ever held a person or corporation guilty of contributory crimi-
nal copyright infringement, despite the content industry's lobbying for
this kind of punishment.' Moreover, even if there were some legal basis
for contributory criminal copyright infringement, the government would
probably have to prove two levels of mens rea-the direct infringer's
and the contributor's-while, as discussed in the next section, the gov-
ernment failed to allege either level in the Rojadirecta case.
78. Cf CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2004) ("Because
LoopNet, as an Internet service provider, is simply the owner and manager of a system used by
others who are violating CoStar's copyrights and is not an actual duplicator itself, it is not directly
liable for copyright infringement.").
79. Puerto 80 would likely not even be considered a contributory infringer in a civil action.
Cf Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 2012) (describing myVidster-a
linking website like Rojadirecta-as the "equivalent to stealing a copyrighted book from a
bookstore and reading it. That is a bad thing to do (in either case) but it is not copyright
infringement.").
80. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) (general conspiracy statute); see also United States v. Dove, 585
F. Supp. 2d 865, 867 (W.D. Va. 2008) (outlining conviction under § 371 for conspiracy to commit
criminal copyright infringement).
8 1. See generally Salil K. Mehra, Keep America Exceptional! Against Adopting Japanese and
European-Style Criminalization of Contributory Copyright Infringement, 13 VAND. J. Er. &
TECH. L. 811 (2011).
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iii. THE COMPLAINT DID NOT ALLEGE WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR
DIRECT CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Because the complaint did not allege who was responsible for
reproducing and performing the copyrighted works,8 2 the complaint was
inadequate as a matter of law to show that mens rea was present to
elevate the infringement from civil to criminal. In order to show that
infringement occurred "willfully" in a criminal case, the government
would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "the act was com-
mitted by a defendant voluntarily, with knowledge that it was prohibited
by law, and with the purpose of violating the law . . . ."8 For civil
forfeiture, therefore, the government must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the infringer was acting "willfully." Common logic
dictates that it is impossible to assess what a person knew or did not
know when the person has not even been identified. As such, the gov-
ernment could not have proved that the infringer acted willfully by
reproducing copyrighted material and posting links to the copies on
Rojadirecta. Clearly, then, by failing to identify the third-party infringer,
the government failed to allege an essential element of its claim. More-
over, if the government hoped to have a factual basis to satisfy this alle-
gation, it seems likely that intensive investigation of Puerto 80, and of
those who posted the links to infringing content, would be required. If
the government were attempting to use civil forfeiture as an easier, less
burdensome way of shutting down Rojadirecta, this benefit would be
entirely lost because of the expense of investigation.
iv. THE COMPLAINT DID NOT ALLEGE THAT PUERTO 80 FAILED TO
COMPLY WITH THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT (DMCA)
Even assuming (without suggesting) that the government met its
initial burden of showing that a third party willfully committed copy-
right infringement, and that Rojadirecta was substantially connected to
this infringement, the pleadings in this case indicate that the government
would not have been able to rebut Puerto 80's potential "innocent
owner" defense in light of the DMCA.
Because no court has ever directly ruled on forfeiture of linking
websites, there is no precedent on how the "innocent owner" provision
82. The Second Motion to Dismiss interpreted the Amended Complaint as alleging only that
Puerto 80 directly infringed the distribution right by linking to infringing copyright, as facilitated
by Rojadirecta. See Second Motion to Dismiss, supra note 68, at 1. However, this interpretation is
not evident from the Amended Complaint, and this Comment posits that the Amended Complaint
was still vague in its allegations.
83. United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 300 (7th Cir. 1987); see also DOJ Manual, supra
note I1, at 26 (warning that a lower standard of mens rea could cause the "net" of criminal
sanctions "[to] be cast too widely") (internal citation omitted).
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of 18 U.S.C. § 939 should be read in conjunction with the safe harbor
provisions of the DMCA, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512. An "innocent
owner" under Section 939(d) is one who either lacks knowledge of the
illicit activities giving rise to the forfeiture or who has knowledge of the
activity but has affirmatively attempted to stop it.84 However, the provi-
sion has been construed to allow showings of "willful blindness" to
defeat an "innocent owner" defense." So, for example, a mother who
found her son growing marijuana in the house and destroyed the plant
she found, but who did not actively search for other plants and did not
alert the police, could not claim an "innocent owner" defense because
she was willfully blind to the ongoing criminal offense."
The DMCA does not, however, attach liability for "willful blind-
ness." To the contrary, for "information location tools" such as
Rojadirecta's index of hyperlinks, only actual knowledge or knowledge
of facts from which "infringing activity is apparent" will suffice to
establish liability." And, unlike the marijuana mom scenario, prior
knowledge cannot lead to liability if the website owner expeditiously
removed or disabled access to the infringing material." Indeed, courts
interpreting Section 512 have consistently held that mere knowledge of
potential or prevalent infringement does not remove a website from the
safe harbor-in essence, the only effective way to attach liability is to
serve a notice that complies with the requirements in Section
512(c)(3)." This position is further bolstered by Section 512(m)'s
explicit decree that service providers have no affirmative duty to moni-
tor or seek out infringing material.90
The government's amended complaint did not allege that any spe-
cific takedown notices were issued. Rather, the complaint alleged that
the sports leagues sent general notices "requesting that the Rojadirecta
Website cease all unauthorized use of copyrighted content." 91 And,
while the complaint alleged many "captures" of infringing material,9 2
84. See United States v. One 1988 Checolet 410 Turbo Prop Aircraft, Dominican Republic
Registration Tail No. H1698CT, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1382 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
85. See id. (rejecting a pure actual knowledge test).
86. United States v. 16328 S. 43rd E. Ave., Bixby, Tulsa County, Okla., 275 F.3d 1281, 1285
(10th Cir. 2002) (applying 21 U.S.C. § 881, the analog of 18 U.S.C. § 2323 for drug offenses).
87. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1)(A)-(B) (2012).
88. Id. at (d)(1)(C).
89. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108-09 (C.D.
Cal. 2009) (finding that "imputed" knowledge would make the DMCA's notice-and-takedown
provisions "completely superfluous"). But see Viacom Intern., Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19,
34-35 (2d Cir. 2012) (suggesting in dicta that "willful blindness" may apply in "appropriate
circumstances," but not elaborating on what those circumstances might be).
90. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m).
91. Amended Complaint, supra note 67, at 15.
92. Id. at 13-14, 16-17.
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the complaint never alleged that the copyright holders nor the govern-
ment followed up on these captures with specific notices requesting the
takedown of these specific videos. Instead, the government included the
following vague policy statement, presumably to justify the failure to
request specific takedowns:
The problem of piracy of live sports broadcasting over the Internet is
particularly pernicious in light of the fact that the value of the copy-
right holder's content is extremely perishable. There is significant
value to consumers in being able to access that content while the
event is still in progress. Unlike other video content offered online,
including television programs and motion pictures, which often
remain popular well after their debut, sports fans' interest in viewing
live sporting events is greatest while the event is happening. In addi-
tion, some sporting events - such as wrestling and boxing - involve
bouts that may end within a matter of a few minutes. Thus, even if a
website is notified by a copyright holder of the infringement and
takes the infringing content down within 15 minutes, the damage is
already done because the pirated telecast has already been seen and
all of the value of the live content has been extracted."
Even if the government's policy concern is valid, it still runs contrary to
the DMCA, and Puerto 80's failure to prevent users from linking to
infringing videos does not mean that Puerto 80 was not an "innocent
owner." As such, if Puerto 80 had raised such a defense, it is likely that
the DMCA would be the governing standard and that Rojadirecta would
be protected by the safe harbor of Section 512.
v. THE COMPLAINT DID NOT PROPERLY PLEAD UNITED
STATES JURISDICTION
The complaint did not even allege that the third-party websites
were hosted by servers in the United States-if the servers were in a
foreign country, they would be outside the territorial scope of the Copy-
right Act. The "place" where infringement occurs is wherever the server
is located.9 4 Therefore, if the infringing material is stored in Canada, for
example, a live stream (meaning no copy is made) of the material on a
computer in the United States is technically not infringing in the United
States. In the Rojadirecta case, the complaint did not identify any of the
third-party websites, did not identify where these websites' servers were
located, and did not identify where these websites were registered. The
complaint merely alleged that viewers live streamed in the United States
93. Id. at 4-5.
94. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying
the "server test").
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and that the domain names were registered in the United States. 9 5 This
alone does not constitute infringement. No court has ever applied civil
forfeiture to an allegedly criminal act that did not take place in the
United States-this would be outside the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2323.
And, significantly, Rojadirecta had faced copyright suits in Spanish
courts twice, and the Spanish courts held Puerto 80's conduct to be
legal.9 6 Therefore, the government's complaint was inadequate to show
that Puerto 80, or anyone connected to Rojadirecta, violated United
States copyright law. All in all, the government's complaint was
severely lacking, and it seems likely that the civil forfeiture suit could
not have been meritorious.
V. MISSTATEMENTS OF LAW IN THE CULTURAL PROPERTY CONTEXT
The government's overreaching application of copyright law is
most certainly rooted in a good-faith desire to eliminate the scourge of
widespread digital infringement, particularly in cases where infringe-
ment is occurring abroad. In a recent article, authors Andrew L. Adler
and Stephen K. Urice noticed a similar problem in the cultural property
context: "Cultural property policy in the United States has become
increasingly lawless, for lack of a better term."" Adler and Urice have
identified the government's tendency to "aggressively restrict the move-
ment of cultural property into the United States" as part of a policy of
preserving history in the property's home country.98 The authors do not
question the wisdom of this policy, but rather object to the disjunction
between, on one hand, the executive branch's one-sided enforcement of
the policy, and, on the other hand, the judiciary's and the legislature's
careful balance in enacting and interpreting the relevant law so as to
provide the fairest outcome in cultural property cases. 99 This Section
will summarize this cultural property conundrum and compare it to the
latest slew of civil forfeiture actions in the copyright infringement
context.
Part I of the Adler/Urice article highlights two civil forfeiture
actions, referred to as the French Automobile case and the Egyptian Sar-
cophagus case." In these two actions, the prosecution failed, as a mat-
95. See Amended Complaint, supra note 67, at 8-9.
96. Second Motion to Dismiss, supra note 68, at 16.
97. Andrew L. Adler & Stephen K. Urice, Resolving the Disjunction Between Cultural
Property Policy and Law: A Call for Reform, 64 RUTGERs L. REv. 117, 117 (2011).
98. See id. at 120.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 125 (citing United States v. 1 (One) French 1919 Vehicle, No. 08-01825 (W.D.
Wash. Dec. 23, 2008), and United States v. One Ancient Egyptian, Yellow Background, Wooden
Sarcophagus, No. 09-23030 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2009)).
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ter of law, to allege and prove certain crucial elements of the National
Stolen Property Act ("NSPA") violations upon which the forfeiture
claim was predicated."o' Nevertheless, because the claimants raised no
opposition, both cultural objects were ultimately returned to their respec-
tive countries of origin.102
A. Proper Interpretation of the NSPA
The NSPA prohibits "the transporation, transmission, or transfer of
any goods worth $5000 or more in interstate or foreign commerce,
knowing the same to have been stolen." 1 Just like the criminal copy-
right infringement statute in the Rojadirecta case, the NSPA permits the
government to bring an in rem civil forfeiture action upon probable
cause that the property was connected to an NSPA violation." Though
NSPA violations are frequently domestic (violating the "interstate com-
merce" provision), certain legal issues arise when the government has
applied the NSPA to cultural property."0 s The primary issue has been
whether a foreign nation's declaration of ownership over undiscovered
antiquities-in the form of a "patrimony law" or "vesting statute"-ren-
ders such goods "stolen" under the NSPA.106 Only three appellate deci-
sions, which will be discussed below, have addressed this issue. 0 7
The first, United States v. Hollinshead, tacitly accepted the prose-
cution's theory that a Guatemalan artifact was "stolen" by virtue of the
Guatemalan patrimony law.'0 s There, the issue of whether the patrimony
law rendered the artifact "stolen" was not preserved on appeal, so the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the proposition as true, without
actually deciding.IO9 Second, in United States v. McClain, the issue of
the NSPA's definition of "stolen" as it relates to a foreign patrimony law
was, in fact, before the court.' o Here, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
performed a thorough analysis and eventually held that a national decla-
ration of ownership over cultural property, paired with a subsequent ille-
gal exportation of that property, rendered the property "stolen" under the
NSPA. 1' In so holding, the court emphasized the distinction between 1)
a patrimony law that actually vests ownership, and 2) a law that restricts
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012).




108. See 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).
109. See Adler & Urice, supra note 97, at 127.
110. See 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977).
111. Id. at 1000-01.
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exportation of, but does not purport to claim title to, property.112 The
latter, the court held, was merely an exercise of "police power" and thus,
when that law was violated, the property was not "stolen."1 13 The court
further justified this reading of the NSPA as being consistent with the
rule that the United States does not enforce the export laws of another
country, absent a treaty or statute providing otherwise." 4
In the third case, United States v. Schultz, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals relied heavily on McClain but modified its holding
slightly.' Schultz held that "the NSPA applies to property that is stolen
from a foreign government, where that government asserts actual own-
ership of the property pursuant to a valid patrimony law.""' For present
purposes, the difference in holdings is less important than the Schultz
and McClain courts' similar reliance on the distinction between owner-
ship and export restrictions."'
B. The French Automobile Case and the Egyptian Sarcophagus
Case: The NSPA Gone Wrong
In December 2008, federal prosecutors in the Western District of
Washington sought to forfeit an antique French automobile by bringing
an in rem civil forfeiture action pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§ 1595a(c)(1)(A)."s This statute provides for civil forfeiture of goods
that were "stolen, smuggled, or clandestinely imported or introduced" in
violation of the NSPA.119 The prosecution based its forfeiture action on
the theory that the automobile was "taken" from France "in violation of
the French Heritage Code."12 0 However, the English translation of the
relevant French Heritage Code provision states: "The export out of
France of items classified as Historical Monuments is forbidden, without
112. Id. at 996-97, 1002.
113. Id. at 1002.
114. Id. at 996.
115. See Adler & Urice, supra note 97, at 129 n.63 ("Although most of the literature assumes
that Schultz adopted McClain wholesale, we believe that Schultz's reliance on Egypt's active,
domestic enforcement of its patrimony law meaningfully distinguishes the case from McClain,
where such enforcement was absent.") (citation omitted).
116. 333 F.3d 393, 416 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
117. See id. at 410 ("We believe that, when necessary, our courts are capable of evaluating
foreign patrimony laws to determine whether their language and enforcement indicate that they
are intended to assert true ownership of certain property, or merely to restrict the export of that
property.").
118. Adler & Urice, supra note 97, at 130 n.66 (citing Verified Complaint for Forfeiture in
Rem, United States v. I (One) French 1919 Vehicle, No. 08-01825 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 2008)).
119. 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(1)(A) (2012).
120. See Adler & Urice, supra note 97, at 131 (citing affidavit in prosecution's verified
complaint).
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detriment to the provisions regarding . . . temporary export . . . .21
Therefore, as Adler and Urice point out, the prosecution's forfeiture
claim was based on a foreign statute that did not even purport to vest
ownership in the country of origin.122 Accepting the government's claim
amounted to the enforcement of France's export laws, which is contrary
to the central rationale in McClain and Schultz. 123 Indeed, the prosecu-
tion even referred to the French Heritage Code as an export restriction,
seemingly unaware that this fact completely undermines the contention
that the automobile was "stolen" under the NSPA.12 4 Because France
never declared itself the owner of the automobile, the government failed
to allege any theft whatsoever, rendering its civil forfeiture claim
unfounded.' 25 Nevertheless, the opposition never asserted this point and,
instead, agreed to return the automobile to France voluntarily.126
Similarly, federal prosecutors in the Southern District of Florida
brought a civil forfeiture action against an Egyptian sarcophagus in
October 2009.127 The sarcophagus had been created between 1070 and
960 B.C., but its owner had no documentation of when it was exported
from Egypt. 12 8 Again, the prosecution's theory for forfeiture was pre-
mised on McClain and Schultz, even though the complaint did not actu-
ally cite the NSPA."12  The complaint recited a series of Egyptian
antiquities laws, presumably to establish Egypt's ownership of the sar-
cophagus."'o The Egyptian laws progressed over time from an 1835 pro-
hibition on exportation, to an eventual declaration of national
ownership. '' In support of its claim for forfeiture, the government made
the conclusory assertion that because Egypt had some sort of patrimony
law since 1874, and because the sarcophagus was "removed from Egypt
in violation of Egyptian law," then the sarcophagus was "stolen" and
subject to forfeiture.13 2 However, the government never alleged when
121. See id. at 131 n.74.
122. See id. at 131.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 131-32.
125. Id. at 132.
126. See id. at 125 n.40 (citing Government's Motion to Dismiss Civil Case, Attached
Stipulation for Settlement of Civil Forfeiture Action at 6-10, United States v. I (One) French
1919 Vehicle, No. 08-01825 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 10 2009)).
127. See id. at 125 n.40 (citing Verified Complaint for Forfeiture in Rem, United States v. One
Ancient Egyptian, Yellow Background, Wooden Sarcophagus, No. 09-23030 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 8,
2009)).
128. See id. at 132-33.
129. See id. at 133.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 134.
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the sarcophagus was removed from Egypt."' Therefore, the court could
have not possibly known which law to apply-if the sarcophagus had
been removed prior to any valid patrimony law, the removal would have
merely violated an export law, just as in the French automobile case.134
If the claimant in the forfeiture action had raised this objection in a
motion to dismiss, the court would have had to grant the motion because
the complaint failed to allege this critical fact. But the claimant never
filed a responsive pleading, and the sarcophagus was forfeited by a
default judgment."3 s
The parallel between these cultural property forfeitures and the for-
feitures pursuant to Operation: In Our Sites is clear. Prosecutors over-
reached by failing to adequately plead the factual elements of the law,
but claimants did not fight for their rights. Courts did not independently
find the pleadings insufficient. Consequently, property owners have lost
what was rightfully theirs based on cases that lacked the necessary fac-
tual development, at best. Now that Rojadirecta has fought back, the
government's underdeveloped theory has been exposed. Indeed, it seems
possible that the government dropped the case purely to prevent an adju-
dication on the merits. Moreover, in both the cultural property and IP
context, the investigation needed to fulfill a factually sufficient pleading
that would make forfeiture impracticable. In short, the broad policy
goals of preventing widespread infringement and of protecting cultural
artifacts may be noble goals, but they cannot excuse conclusory
pleadings with underdeveloped facts.
VI. LEGISLATIVE ACTION SURROUNDING DOMAIN NAME
SEIZURES FOR INFRINGEMENT
Lawmakers have been considering expanding IP protection to serve
the aforementioned policy goals. Following the passage of the Prioritiz-
ing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008
("Pro-IP Act"),"' subsequent bills proposing more stringent IP regula-
tions have been circulated throughout Congress. None of these bills have
passed. This Section will discuss these recent legislative attempts: the
Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act of 2010
("COICA"),'37 the Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativ-
133. Id.
134. See id. at 134-135.
135. Id. at 125 n.40 (citing Default Judgment of Forfeiture, United States v. One Ancient
Egyptian, Yellow Background, Wooden Sarcophagus, No. 09-23030 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2009)).
136. Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 17
U.S.C., and 18 U.S.C. (2008)) [hereinafter Pro-IP Act].
137. S. 3804, 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter COICA].
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ity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011 ("PIPA"), 1 3 and the
Stop Online Piracy Act ("SOPA").13 9 The failure of these bills to be
passed into law further bolsters the conclusion that the current state of
the law does not support the forfeiture of linking websites. To under-
stand the relevance of these failed bills, however, the Pro-IP Act must
first be explained.
A. The Pro-IP Act
The Pro-IP Act, passed in 2008, enhanced criminal penalties for all
areas of IP, including copyright infringement.14 0 Notably, the Pro-IP Act
repealed 17 U.S.C. § 509, which outlined forfeiture procedures, in favor
of the more detailed and stringent forfeiture structure of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2323.'"' However, Representatives Chris Cannon of Utah and Zoe
Lofgren of California opposed this new structure and urged that the bill
be revised. 4 2 Representative Cannon, for example, outlined the over-
reaching scope of the forfeiture scheme: "[I]f you have got a kid who
downloads music improperly, your computer may be seized."l 4 3 He con-
tinued to call the bill as drafted "an extraordinary assertion of Federal
authority over what we do with our personal lives and our computers
and our equipment."" Similarly, Representative Lofgren criticized the
bill, as well as Congress's "unbridled zeal" for IP regulation in general,
as an unbalanced shift to benefit corporate interests while criminalizing
"innocent intermediaries."l 45 Despite these prescient concerns, only
eleven members of the House voted against the Pro-IP Act.14 6 The bill
was passed into law on October 13, 2008, with the forfeiture scheme as
drafted now legally in place.14 7
The Pro-IP Act drew immediate criticism for effectuating Repre-
sentatives Cannon and Lofgren's fears. For example, the broad
prosecutorial authority given to the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
under the Act was particularly worrisome.14 8 The new civil forfeiture
138. S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter PIPA].
139. H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter SOPA].
140. See generally Title II of the Pro-IP Act, supra note 136.
141. See Grace Pyun, The 2008 Pro-IP Act: The Inadequacy of the Property Paradigm in
Criminal Intellectual Property Law and Its Effect on Prosecutorial Boundaries, 19 DEPAUL J.
ART, TECH. & INTELL. PRoP. L. 355, 377 (2009).
142. See 154 CONG. REc. H10229, H10237 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statements of Rep.




146. See "Background on Domain Name Seizures," available at Lofgren Proposal, supra note
1.
147. See generally Pro-IP Act, supra note 136.
148. See, e.g., Pyun, supra, note 141, at 385-93.
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provisions incentivize DOJ prosecutors to become more involved in
civil matters, even using civil forfeiture as a sort of screening device to
see which cases would lead to a meritorious criminal prosecution.14 9 As
initially conceived, the civil forfeiture structure would be a way for the
IP rightholder to bring private suit to recover infringing property without
needing government intervention.15 o In fact, Pro-IP Act drafter Senator
Patrick Leahy intended to include a provision by which the Attorney
General could initiate civil IP enforcement actions at his discretion, but
this provision was stricken without legislative comment.' 5 1 Neverthe-
less, the civil forfeiture regime has proved to effectuate this very plan by
implementing prosecutorial involvement in what would otherwise be a
private matter.15' This blurred boundary between private and govern-
mental IP enforcement demonstrates the government's willingness to
protect the content industry's interests over the rights of the general
public. 3
B. COICA
In 2010, presumably encouraged by the passage of the Pro-IP Act,
Senator Leahy introduced Senate Bill 3804-COICA-to "provide the
Justice Department with an important tool to crack down on Web sites
dedicated to online infringement." 54 A web site "dedicated to infringing
activities" is first defined as one that is already forfeitable under 18
U.S.C. § 2323.ss These sites would be subjected to domain name dis-
abling.156 However, COICA further broadens the scope of offending
sites by providing that a website is also "dedicated to infringing activi-
ties" if it is:
(i) [P]rimarily designed, has no demonstrable, commercially signifi-
cant purpose or use other than, or is marketed by its operator, or by a
person acting in concert with the operator-
(I) to offer goods or services in violation of title 17 United States
Code, or that enable or facilitate a violation of title 17, United
149. Id. at 386-87 (explaining that civil forfeiture could potentially obviate the need for
criminal prosecution and its higher procedural burdens).
150. See id. at 386-89.
151. See id. at 387.
152. See id. at 387-88; see also DOJ Manual, supra note 11, at 370 ("Prosecutors may need to
participate in these civil proceedings in order to preserve evidence relevant to an incipient or
ongoing criminal case; to contest the issuance of an order; to preserve an ongoing investigation; or
to inform the mark-holder of his ability to initiate a parallel civil case to seize, forfeit, and destroy
equipment used to manufacture the counterfeit trademark goods.").
153. See Pyun, supra note 141, at 387-88.
154. 156 CONG. REc. S7207 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2010) (statement by Sen. Leahy).
155. COICA, supra note 137, at § 2(a)(1)(A).
156. Ann Chaitovitz et al., Responding to Online Piracy: Mapping the Legal and Policy
Boundaries, 20 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 18 (2011).
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States Code, including but not limited to offering or providing
access in .a manner not authorized by the copyright owner or
otherwise by operation of law, copies or phonorecords of, or
public performances or displays of works protected by title 17,
in complete or substantially complete form, by any means,
including by means of download, streaming, or other transmis-
sion, provision of a link or aggregated links to other sites or
Internet resources for obtaining access to such copies, pho-
norecords, performances, displays, goods, or service . . . and
(ii).. . when taken together, such activities are the central activities
of the Internet site or sites accessed through a specific domain
name. 57
Unlike the Pro-IP Act, the remedy against this second class of sites is
injunctive relief, not forfeiture."5 s Nevertheless, the breadth of website
regulation under COICA was astonishing.
This expanded definition of actionable websites was intended to be
a "much-needed aggressive step" in fighting piracy, as technology had
advanced just beyond the reach of current statutes. 1 9 For example, file-
sharing websites have made infringing copies readily available, while
making it difficult to identify who is responsible for the acts of piracy. 160
However, opponents of the bill cautioned that, while the bill would
effectively decrease piracy, it would also be an impermissible censorship
that would hinder innocent parties' ability to communicate, as well as a
potential threat to technological innovation. 161
In November 2010, the Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously
voted to approve COICA,162 but the bill was put on hold and eventually
died at the close of the Congressional session.163 Nevertheless, the sub-
stance of COICA was ripe for resurrection.
C. PIPA and SOPA
At the start of the 112th Congress, Senator Leahy introduced PIPA
as a reincarnation of COICA.'" PIPA attempted to address the concerns
157. COICA, supra note 137, at § 2(a)(1)(B); see also id. at § 2(c) (authorizing in rem actions
against such sites).
158. Id. at § 2(g)(1).
159. Ashley S. Pawliz, The Bill of Unintended Consequences: The Combating Online
Infingement and Counterfeit Act, 21 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 283, 302 (2011).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 304.
162. See Sam Gustin, Web Censorship Bill Sails Through Senate Committee, WIED (Nov. 18,
2010, 2:50 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/11/coica-web-censorship-bill/.
163. See Jeffrey A. Lindenbaum & David Ewen, Catch Me If You Can: An Analysis of New
Enforcement Measures and Proposed Legislation to Combat the Sale of Counterfeit Products on
the Internet, 32 PACE L. REv. 567, 619 (2012).
164. See id.
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of COICA opponents by taking a somewhat less rigid stance. For exam-
ple, the definition of a site "dedicated to infringing activities" now
included a site with "no significant use other than engaging in, enabling
in, or facilitating [copyright infringement]" 16 5-a narrower scope than
COICA's "primarily designed" or "marketed . . . to offer" standard.
Nevertheless, PIPA faced as much opposition as COICA did, and after a
massive online protest against the bill, Senate Majority Leader Harry
Reid delayed voting on PIPA indefinitely.16 6
SOPA was "the House of Representatives' version of PIPA."16 7
Though PIPA was narrower in scope than COICA, SOPA is broader.
First, SOPA continued to use the "primary purpose" test, rather than
PIPA's "no other significant use" test, for targetable websites.'16 Suffer-
ing the same fate as PIPA, on January 20, 2012, the House Judiciary
Committee announced that it would postpone consideration of the legis-
lation until there was "wider agreement on a solution."169
PIPA's focus targeted only the most egregious of infringers. 17 0
Therefore, if the distribution or availability of infringing goods were
incidental to the site's legal commercial purpose, the site would be
beyond PIPA's scope. 71 Consequently, if PIPA had been passed, surely
many website owners subject to suit would have claimed that their
infringement was incidental and not the sole reason for the site's exis-
tence. Indeed, even though PIPA was never passed, Rojadirecta made
this very assertion in its motions to dismiss.
Even if PIPA sought only to regulate the most extreme of infring-
ers, its methods for doing so were extremely contentious. PIPA autho-
rized the Attorney General to order third parties such as financial
transaction providers (for example, PayPal) and "information location
tools" (for example, Google) to cut off the alleged infringers. 17 2 SOPA
also utilized these methods, essentially seeking to blackball any alleg-
edly infringing site."' Notably, these two bills severely undermine the
safe harbor provisions of the DMCA by targeting sites that may readily
comply with DMCA takedown procedures. 174 Again, despite these bills
165. PIPA, supra note 138, at § 2(7)(A) (emphasis added).
166. Jonathan Weisman, After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves Antipiracy Bills, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 21, 2012, at B6.
167. See Mike Belleville, IP Wars: SOPA, PIPA, and the Fight Over Online Piracy, 26 TEMP.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 303, 320 (2012).
168. SOPA, supra note 139, at § 103(a)(1)(B)(i).
169. Weisman, supra note 166.
170. See Chaitovitz et al., supra note 156, at 18.
171. Id.
172. See PIPA, supra note 138, at §§ 3(d)(2)(B), 3(d)(2)(D).
173. Belleville, supra note 167, at 320.
174. Id. at 321.
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never being passed, Rojadirecta was in fact "cut off' by Google follow-
ing a complaint from Major League Baseball."' Even though Google
did eventually reinstate Rojadirecta within its search engine, the fact that
Google blocked Rojadirecta in the first place shows that Google may not
have been operating consistently with the DMCA, but rather may have
attempted to comply with SOPA in anticipation of the bill passing.
D. Failed Legislative Attempts as Reflective of the Current State of
Infringement Enforcement Law
COICA, PIPA, and SOPA were all struck down for heavily weigh-
ing the content industry's interests over the interests of the free-speaking
public and the technological innovators. Nevertheless, government
actions such as ICE's seizures suggest that bills like these are far from
dead. Even staunch opponent of domain name seizure Zoe Lofgren has
implied a sort of defacto enactment, seeking legislation that would regu-
late the due process rights that accompany domain name seizure."
While Lofgren may be right in seeking legislative procedural protection
in the face of potentially unlawful seizures, this does little to mitigate the
real source of the problem. Lofgren-perhaps through another Reddit
initiative-should be more aggressive by, say, proposing an amendment
to 18 U.S.C. § 2323 to clarify that sites like Rojadirecta are not
forfeitable.
Still, the amended complaint in the Rojadirecta case suggests that
the government believes that the provisions of COICA, PIPA, and
SOPA are the current state of the law. For example, as it stands, domain
name forfeiture for criminal copyright infringement requires no analysis
of the "primary purpose" or the "substantial use" of the website. Rather,
the current regime is a sort of strict liability analysis: if the elements of
criminal copyright infringement can be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence, and if the domain name facilitates criminal copyright infringe-
ment, then it does not matter what the domain name's purpose is. How-
ever, the government's complaint, pleading that "more than half' of
Rojadirecta was "dedicated to making infringing content available""'
seems to be predicated on this requirement in the failed COICA, PIPA,
and SOPA bills. Additionally, the government's allegation that
175. Google and MLB's Mistakes Result in the Removal of Rojadirecta.es From the Search
Engine, ROJDIRECrA (BLOG) (Apr. 22, 2011), http://blog.rojadirecta.me/.
176. See Lofgren Proposal, supra note 1 ("Although I am considering introducing a bill on
domain name seizures for infringement, that does not mean I accept the practice as legal or
[c]onstitutional. Nonetheless, since these seizure actions are occurring, I thought it worthwhile to
explore a legislative means providing appropriate protections for free expression and due
process.").
177. Amended Complaint, supra note 67, at 9-10.
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Rojadirecta "purposefully aggregated and organized" the hyperlinks is
irrelevant to current copyright law but would perhaps have some signifi-
cance under the unpassed bills.
VII. CONCLUSION
Digital copyright infringement is indisputably one of the most
widespread crimes in the United States, and the content industry is justi-
fied in seeking federal assistance to preserve IP rights. Still, ICE's use of
civil forfeiture to target aggregating, but innocuous, websites (rather
than going after each individual infringer) is legally unfounded.
As this Comment argues, the government's theory behind the
Rojadirecta forfeiture attempt was convoluted and underdeveloped. Who
was the alleged copyright infringer? Puerto 80? An unidentified third
party? How could the government have possibly met the "willfulness"
element as required for civil forfeiture when it had not even named
whose "will" was to be examined? As it turns out, no matter who the
government tried to blame, Rojadirecta would have still been beyond the
bounds of the civil forfeiture regime. The interpretation of domain name
forfeiture that the government advanced would have encompassed tech-
nological mainstays such as Google or Yahoo-a result surely not
intended by Congress.
Looking to the future, owners of seized domain names should be
more assertive and should at least challenge ICE's actions, if only in
hopes of getting a clear judicial determination that these actions are
unfounded. On the other hand, Operation: In Our Sites needs to be more
narrowly focused to take down direct criminal infringers only. If the
government seeks to forfeit sites like Rojadirecta, the solution is Con-
gressional enactment of a bill like COICA, SOPA, or PIPA. Until that
happens, any such seizure would have to be founded on a misapplication
of law. And, like in the cultural property context, prosecutors must not
let their quest to quelch piracy supersede the necessity of alleging and
proving the basic elements of a crime.
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